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The Camel Corps Experiment
Abstract

“Did you know there was a push to create a Camel Corps right before the beginning of the American Civil
War?” This certainly seems like an interesting piece of trivia to share around the dinner table, but what was the
Camel Corps and what insights can it provide on U.S. military thinking in the mid-19th century? I believe that
the Camel Corps Experiment, regardless of whether it was deemed an utter failure or not, demonstrated
progressive military thought and the desire of its advocates to explore advancements in both mobility and
technology for military practices. [excerpt]
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The Camel Corps Experiment
By Abigail Major ’19
“Did you know there was a push to create a Camel Corps right before the beginning of
the American Civil War?” This certainly seems like an interesting piece of trivia to share
around the dinner table, but what was the Camel Corps and what insights can it provide
on U.S. military thinking in the mid-19th century? I believe that the Camel Corps
Experiment, regardless of whether it was deemed an utter failure or not, demonstrated
progressive military thought and the desire of its advocates to explore advancements in
both mobility and technology for military practices.
Where did the push for the utilization of camels come from in the first place? Historian
Harold Schindler suggests that, like horses which were not native to America but
flourished when introduced, camels too had the potential to be successful in theory. In
the early 20th century, U.S. Army explorer Stephen Harriman Long wrote General
Description of the Country Traversed by the Exploring Expedition, which included his
description of parts of the West as “completely destitute” possessing little vegetation and
sterile soil. His word choices in his description suggests that the American West held
many desert-like qualities. For then Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, the American
Desert represented a lack of the nation’s unity. The vast barren interior of the West
presented the issue of disconnectedness because it was not easy or simple to travel. If a
solution to the transportation problem in the West were achieved, it would not only
connect the Western territories to the more populated East Coast, but it would also aid
in creating a united nation of Americans.
For some military and political leaders, camel transportation was the solution to the
issues of unity and military transportation. Traveling and carrying materials by using
wagons drawn by mules, horses, or oxen was time consuming and expensive, especially
when considering the animals’ great dependency on water and grass – two factors that
were not bountiful in the “American Desert.” Camels, on the other hand, could travel
longer on fewer provisions. It is likely that Davis was a great supporter of this idea due
to the encouragement of select group of peers, and because of his familiarity with
Napoleon’s memoirs, which included the French leader’s own fascination with the
dromedary camel (an Arabian one humped camel) and its hardiness. In 1855 Congress
finally approved the experiment, and Major Wayne and Lieutenant David D. Porter, two
men who played a significant part in convincing Davis to advocate for the camel project,
acquired thirty-three camels from Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia.

At first, the project seemed to go well. The camels were successful in their tests around
San Antonio and Camp Verde, Texas. In addition to their lack of grass and water
dependency, camels could ford rivers much easier than mules, carry heavier loads, and
did not require shoeing. It seemed as if the only downside was the smell and appearance
of the camels, which seemed to bother the horses – a seemingly small disadvantage
compared to the supposed various advantages of camel utilization. Even LieutenantColonel Robert E. Lee, who had used camels on a patrol in 1860, praised the camels’
capabilities.
Yet the experiment began to
unravel as issues began to rise
to the surface. The project had
a lack of public support.
Packers and freighters in the
South disliked the economic
competition and army men
stationed at Camp Verde
thought the experiment was
ridiculous. In addition, a
cultural barrier might have
also contributed to the failure
of the camel experiment.
While some leaders of the
project, such as George
Perkins Marsh, had witnessed
camel usage and traveled to
Egypt, Syria, and Arabia, a
majority of people (both
civilians and government
officials) were not well familiar
with camel transportation.
This reluctance to change from
mules and horses to camels, as
well as the potential lack of
knowledge of how to utilize
these animals to their full
extent, could be a couple
additional reasons why the
camel experiment failed to
gain the mass support it
crucially needed.
A photo of Old Douglas’s memorial
marker at Cedar Hill Cemetery,
Vicksburg, Mississippi. Taken
by Natalie Maynor.

By the eve of the Civil War, the experiment had collapsed. While camels were still
present during the Civil War, Union forces did not use the camels found in Camp Tejon,
California, because they could not understand how the camels could be used for any
missions. Similarly, the Confederacy did not use the animals for any major operations.
One notable exception lies in Douglas the camel. Affectionately known as Old Douglas,
he was the only known camel to be used militarily east of the Mississippi River during
the American Civil War. He become the mascot for the 43rd Mississippi Regiment, and
also assisted in carrying baggage for the officers. During the Siege of Vicksburg, Old
Douglas, who had been “harmlessly grazing,” was shot by Federal sharpshooters. In The
Camel Regiment: A History of the Bloody 43rd Mississippi Volunteer Infantry, CSA,
1862-65, Author Scott W. Bell includes Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Bevier’s account of
what happened afterwards: Douglas was “pierced by several bullets at one discharge,
and fell with a piteous, almost human moan, to expire in a strange land far from the
‘help of Islam.’ All who saw it were highly incensed at this useless cruelty.”
With this one exception of Douglas, the Camel Corps experiment can be interpreted as a
failure. It was disbanded by Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton – who was supposedly
unaware that such a project existed – and by the end of the Civil War, most of the
camels were sold. If the camel experiment can be regarded as unsuccessful, and perhaps
even an embarrassment for the government who had invested a substantial amount of
money in this project, is there any value to remembering this vailed venture? The camel
corps experiment demonstrates the desire of military and political leaders to solve the
issue of mobility apparent in the “American Desert”, and to promote connectedness of
the nation – the latter idea which obviously fell apart during the American Civil War.
The attempted utilization of camels in military operations and practices also indicates
how government officials hoped to advance the nation’s military forces. Indeed, the
Great Failed Camel Corps Experiment represents the idea of “trial and error”—through
the failure of the camel experiment, other ideas of mobility for the “American Desert”
and the military could be proposed.
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